through them, viz. conclusions, about
which is _science,_ so in the practical reason, certain things
pre-exist, as naturally known principles, and such are the ends of
the moral virtues, since the end is in practical matters what
principles are in speculative matters, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 7,
ad 2; I-II, Q. 13, A. 3); while certain things are in the practical
reason by way of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather
from the ends themselves. About these is prudence, which applies
universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical
matters. Consequently it does not belong to prudence to appoint the
end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.

Reply Obj. 1: Natural reason known by the name of _synderesis_
appoints the end to moral virtues, as stated above (I, Q. 79, A. 12):
but prudence does not do this for the reason given above.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they
appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is
appointed by natural reason. In this they are helped by prudence,
which prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it
follows that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and
moves them: yet _synderesis_ moves prudence, just as the
understanding of principles moves science.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 7]

Whether It Belongs to Prudence to Find the Mean in Moral Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to
find the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is
the end of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to
moral virtues, as shown above (A. 6). Therefore it does not find the
mean in them.

Obj. 2: Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have
no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said to
have being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs
to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as
shown above (A. 5, Obj. 1). Therefore prudence does not cause the
mean in moral virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral
virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as
Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a
second nature in accord with reason." Therefore prudence does not
appoint the mean to moral virtues.

_On th