oxicating drink in order to procure
vomiting, since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore
this is no sufficient cause for excusing a man from drunkenness.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 3]

Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins.
For Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth.) that "nothing gains the
devil's favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the
vices." And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante
omnia): "Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by
the clergy, for it foments and fosters all the vices."

Obj. 2: Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good of
reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of
drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.

Obj. 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of its
punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely; for
Ambrose says [*De Elia et de Jejunio v] that "there would be no
slavery, were there no drunkards." Therefore drunkenness is the
greatest of sins.

_On the contrary,_ According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12),
spiritual vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one
of the carnal vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins.

_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be evil because it removes a
good. Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver
the evil. Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a
human good. Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are
graver than the sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the
good of human reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Man is most prone to sins of intemperance, because such
like concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us, and for this
reason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the devil, not
for being graver than other sins, but because they occur more
frequently among men.

Reply Obj. 2: The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in one way
by that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which takes
away the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has more
the character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of
reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by
drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas the goods of virtue,
which are taken away by things that are contrary to r