ody, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is
said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its
delight, according to Ps. 22:5, "My chalice which inebriateth me, how
goodly is it!" Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in
speaking of the contemplation of wisdom.

Reply Obj. 2: All the things that belong properly to temperance are
necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful. Wherefore
it behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This is the
business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to
designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than
in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with
drink.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a measure is needful in all things, sobriety
is not properly employed in connection with all things, but only in
those wherein there is most need for a measure.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 2]

Whether Sobriety Is by Itself a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special
virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now
there is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety,
which is about drink, a special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of touch
as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make
food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment.
Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment, drink
is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats and
of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue,
seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each
different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it
would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somno Scip. i, 8] reckons sobriety
to be a special part of temperance.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 146, A. 2), it belongs to moral
virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which may
hinder it. Hence wherever we find a special hindrance to reason,
there must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating
drink is a special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch
as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove
this hindra