d in reference to those wants.

The Austro-Hungarian Delegations are another exception to the rule.
These Delegations undoubtedly control the ministry of the Empire, or at
all events do in practice displace it by their votes. It is made
formally responsible to them by the Constitution. All that Mr. Dicey can
say to this is that "the real responsibility of the Ministry to the
Delegations admits of a good deal of doubt," and that, at all events,
it is not like the responsibility of Mr. Gladstone or Lord Salisbury to
the British Parliament. This may be true, but the more mysterious or
peculiar it is the better it illustrates the danger of speaking of any
particular piece of machinery or of any particular division of power as
an essential feature of a federal constitution.

We are told by the critics of the Gladstonian scheme that federalism is
not "a plan for disuniting the parts of a united state." But whether it
is or not once more depends on circumstances. Federalism, like the
British or French Constitution, is an arrangement intended to satisfy
the people who set it up by gratifying some desire or removing some
cause of discontent. If that discontent be due to unity, federalism
disunites; if it be due to disunion, federalism unites. In the case of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for instance, it clearly is a "plan for
disuniting the parts of a united state." Austria and Hungary were united
in the sense in which the opponents of Home Rule use the word for many
years before 1867, but the union did not work, that is, did not produce
moral as well as legal unity. A constitution was therefore invented
which disunites the two countries for the purposes of domestic
legislation, but leaves them united for the purposes of foreign
relations. This may be a queer arrangement. Although it has worked well
enough thus far, it may not continue to work well, but it does work well
now. It has succeeded in converting Hungary from a discontented and
rebellious province and a source of great weakness to Austria into a
loyal and satisfied portion of the Empire. In other words, it has
accomplished its purpose. It was not intended to furnish a symmetrical
piece of federalism. It was intended to conciliate the Hungarian people.
When therefore the professional federal architects make their tour of
inspection and point out to the Home Ruler what flagrant departures from
the correct federal model the Austro-Hungarian Constitution contains,
how impr