side world, there was a bitter controversy
between the Foreign Office, as headed by the Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg; the Navy Department, headed by Grand Admiral von
Tirpitz, and General von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff. The
Chancellor delayed mobilisation of the German Army three days. For
this he never has and never will be forgiven by the military
authorities. During those stirring days of July and August, when
General von Moltke, von Tirpitz, von Falkenhayn, Krupps and the Rhine
Valley Industrial leaders were clamouring for war and for an invasion
of Belgium, the Kaiser was being urged by the Chancellor and the
Foreign Office to heed the proposals of Sir Edward Grey for a Peace
Conference. But the Kaiser, who was more of a soldier than a
statesman, sided with his military friends. The war was on, not only
between Germany and the Entente, but between the Foreign Office and the
Army and Navy. This internal fight which began in July, 1914, became
Germany's bitterest struggle and from time to time the odds went from
one side to another. The Army accused the diplomats of blundering in
starting the war. The Foreign Office replied that it was the lust for
power and victory which poisoned the military leaders which caused the
war. Belgium was invaded against the counsel of the Foreign Office.
But when the Chancellor was confronted with the actual invasion and the
violation of the treaty, he was compelled by force of circumstance, by
his position and responsibility to the Kaiser to make his famous speech
in the Reichstag in which he declared: "Emergency knows no law."

But when the allied fleet swept German ships from the high seas and
isolated a nation which had considered its international commerce one
of its greatest assets, considerable animosity developed between the
Army and Navy. The Army accused the Navy of stagnation. Von Tirpitz,
who had based his whole naval policy upon a great navy, especially upon
battleship and cruiser units, was confronted by his military friends
with the charge that he was not prepared. As early as 1908 von Tirpitz
had opposed the construction of submarines. Speaking in the Reichstag
when naval appropriations were debated, he said Germany should rely
upon a battleship fleet and not upon submarines. But when he saw his
great inactive Navy in German waters, he switched to the submarine idea
of a blockade of England. In February, 1915, he announced his
submarine blockade