oming from Cracow
might move upon the western bank. The Russian plan no doubt was to
threaten both enemy capitals. Moreover, an advance of Russia from Cracow
would take its armies into Silesia, full of coal and iron mines, and one
of the greatest manufacturing districts in the German Empire. This would
be a real success, and all Germany would feel the blow.

Another reason for the Russian advance in Galicia was her desire to
control the Galician oil wells. To Germany petrol had become one of the
foremost munitions of war. Since she could not obtain it from either
America or Russia she must get it from Austria, and the Austrian oil
fields were all in Galicia. This, in itself, would explain the Galician
campaign. Moreover, through the Carpathian Mountains it was possible to
make frequent raids into Hungary, and Russia understood well the feeling
of Hungary toward her German allies.

She hoped that when Hungary perceived her regiments sacrificed and her
plains overrun by Russian troops, she would regret that she had allowed
herself to be sacrificed to Prussian ambition. The Russians, therefore,
suddenly, moved toward Cracow.

Then von Hindenburg came to the rescue. The supreme command of the
Austrian forces was given to him. The defenses of Cracow were
strengthened under the direction of the Germans, and a German army
advanced from the Posen frontier toward the northern bank of the
Vistula. The advance threatened the Russian right, and, accordingly,
within ten days' march of Cracow, the Russians stopped. The German
offensive in Poland had begun. The news of the German advance came about
the fifth of October. Von Hindenburg, who had been fighting in East
Prussia, had at last perceived that nothing could be gained there. The
vulnerable part of Russia was the city of Warsaw. This was the capital
of Poland, with a population of about three-quarters of a million. If he
could take Warsaw, he would not only have pleasant quarters for the
winter but Russia would be so badly injured that no further offensive
from her need be anticipated for a long period. Von Hindenburg had with
him a large army. In his center he probably had three-quarters of a
million men, and on his right the Austrian army in Cracow, which must
have reached a million.

Counting the troops operating in East Prussia and along the Carpathians,
and the garrison of Przemysl, the Teuton army must have had two and a
half million soldiers. Russia, on the other hand,