ht to advance the
interests and promote the welfare of its people. Russia naturally
had a great deal of interest in Manchuria, and felt that she had
a right to expand through the uncivilized regions of Manchuria,
especially since she needed a satisfactory outlet to the sea. In
other words, the interests of Russia were in the line of its expanding
to the eastward. But Japan's interests were precisely the reverse of
Russia's--that is, Japan's interests demanded that Russia should not
do those things that Russia wanted to do. Japan felt that Russia's
movement toward the East was bringing her entirely too close to
Japan. Russia was too powerful a country, and too aggressive, to
be trusted so close. Japan had the same feeling toward Russia that
any man might have on seeing another man, heavily armed, gradually
coming closer to him in the night. Japan especially wished that
Russia should have no foothold in Corea, feeling, as she expressed
it, that the point of Corea under Russian power would be a dagger
directed at the heart of Japan. This feeling about Corea was the
same feeling that every country has about land near her; it has
a marked resemblance to the feeling that the United States has
embodied in Monroe Doctrine.

After several years of negotiation in which Japan and Russia endeavored
to secure their respective aims by diplomacy, diplomacy was finally
abandoned and the sword taken up instead. Japan, _because of the
superior foresight of her statesmen_, was the first to realize
that diplomacy must fail, was the first to realize that she must
prepare for war, was the first to begin adequate preparation for
war, was the first to complete preparation for war, was the first
to strike, and in consequence was the victor. Yet Russia was a
very much larger, richer, more populous country than Japan.

Russia sent large forces of soldiers to Manchuria by the trans-Siberian
railroad, and Japan sent large forces there by transports across the
Sea of Japan. Japan could not prevent the passage of soldiers by
the railroad, but Russia could prevent the passage of transports
across the Japan Sea, provided her fleet could overcome the Japanese
fleet and get command of the sea. Russia had a considerable fleet
in the Far East; but she had so underestimated the naval ability
of the Japanese, that the Russian fleet proved unequal to the task;
and the Japanese gradually reduced it to almost nothing, with very
little loss to themselves.