e has constituted military governments in the Rebel
States, with governors nominated by himself,--all of which testifies
against the old pretension. Strange will it be, if this extraordinary
power, amply conceded to the President, is denied to Congress.
Practically the whole question with which I began is opened here.
Therefore to this aspect of it I ask your first attention.
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT _vs._. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
Four military governors have been already appointed: one for Tennessee,
one for South Carolina, one for North Carolina, and the other for
Louisiana. So far as is known, the appointment of each was by a simple
letter from the Secretary of War. But if this can be done in four
States, where is the limit? It may be done in every Rebel State, and if
not in every other State of the Union, it will be simply because the
existence of a valid State government excludes the exercise of this
extraordinary power. But assuming, that, as our arms prevail, it will be
done in every Rebel State, we shall then have _eleven_ military
governors, all deriving their authority from one source, ruling a
population amounting to upwards of nine millions. And this imperatorial
dominion, indefinite in extent, will also be indefinite in duration; for
if, under the Constitution and laws, it be proper to constitute such
governors, it is clear that they may be continued without regard to
time,--for years, if you please, as well as for weeks,--and the whole
region which they are called to sway will be a military empire, with all
powers, executive, legislative, and even judicial, derived from one man
in Washington. Talk of the "one-man power." Here it is with a vengeance.
Talk of military rule. Here it is, in the name of a republic.
The bare statement of this case may put us on our guard. We may well
hesitate to organize a single State under a military government, when we
see where such a step will lead. If you approve one, you must approve
all, and the National Government may crystallize into a military
despotism.
In appointing military governors of States, we follow an approved
example in certain cases beyond the jurisdiction of our Constitution, as
in California and Mexico after their conquest and before peace. It is
evident that in these cases there was no constraint from the
Constitution, and we were perfectly free to act according to the assumed
exigency. It may be proper to set up military governors for a conquered
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