their return to
port for repairs.
Of the twenty-two torpedo boats leaving Toulon a few days before, but six
arrived near the enemy, although their commanders displayed admirable
energy. One had run aground, and was full of water; another had been sunk
by collision; another's engine was seriously injured; and as for the rest,
they could not follow.
Of the boats under the command of Admiral Brown de Colstoun, but five
remained for service, for the sixth received an accident to her machinery
which prevented her taking part in the attack.
During the operations off the Balearic Isles, only one of six boats
attacked, and none was able to follow the armorclads, all meeting with
circumstances quite unexpected and embarrassing.
With the weather as it existed May 13, the armorclads had the torpedo fleet
completely at their mercy, for even if they had not been destroyed by the
excellent practice of the Hotchkiss gunners, they would have been of no
use, as they could not with safety discharge their torpedoes. In fact, the
search lights discovered distinctly that one of the boats, which burned her
Coston's signal to announce victory, did not have her torpedo tube open, on
account of the heavy sea.
Furthermore, their positions were frequently easily discovered by the
immense volume of smoke and flame ejected while going at great speed. This
applies as well by night as by day. It was also reported that after the
four days' running the speed of the boats was reduced to twelve knots.
With such evidence before us, the seaworthiness of boats of the Nos. 63 and
64 type may be seriously questioned. Weyl emphasizes the facts that
"practice has shown that boats of No. 61 type cannot make headway in a
heavy sea, and that it is then often impossible to open their torpedo
tubes. On this account they are greatly inferior to ships of moderate
tonnage, which can certainly make some progress, fire their torpedoes, and
use their artillery in weather when a torpedo boat will be utterly
helpless. The torpedo boat abandoned to itself has a very limited field of
action."
Du Pin de Saint Andre admits the success of the torpedo boat for harbor and
coast work, but wisely concludes that this can prove nothing as to what
they may or may not be able to do at sea.
In an article which appeared in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_ in June last,
he presented able reasons why the torpedo boats of to-day's type, being
destitute of most, if not all, of the
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