ense becomes keener and more intense,
especially when confined within narrow limits. The savage with little
or no thought has a quicker discernment of the track than the civilised
man; in like manner the dog, having the help of scent as well as of
sight, is superior to the savage. By use again the inward thought
becomes more defined and distinct; what was at first an effort is made
easy by the natural instrumentality of language, and the mind learns to
grasp universals with no more exertion than is required for the sight of
an outward object. There is a natural connexion and arrangement of them,
like the association of objects in a landscape. Just as a note or two of
music suffices to recall a whole piece to the musician's or composer's
mind, so a great principle or leading thought suggests and arranges a
world of particulars. The power of reflection is not feebler than the
faculty of sense, but of a higher and more comprehensive nature. It not
only receives the universals of sense, but gives them a new content by
comparing and combining them with one another. It withdraws from the
seen that it may dwell in the unseen. The sense only presents us with
a flat and impenetrable surface: the mind takes the world to pieces and
puts it together on a new pattern. The universals which are detached
from sense are reconstructed in science. They and not the mere
impressions of sense are the truth of the world in which we live; and
(as an argument to those who will only believe 'what they can hold in
their hands') we may further observe that they are the source of our
power over it. To say that the outward sense is stronger than the
inward is like saying that the arm of the workman is stronger than the
constructing or directing mind.

Returning to the senses we may briefly consider two questions--first
their relation to the mind, secondly, their relation to outward
objects:--

1. The senses are not merely 'holes set in a wooden horse' (Theaet.),
but instruments of the mind with which they are organically connected.
There is no use of them without some use of words--some natural or
latent logic--some previous experience or observation. Sensation, like
all other mental processes, is complex and relative, though apparently
simple. The senses mutually confirm and support one another; it is hard
to say how much our impressions of hearing may be affected by those
of sight, or how far our impressions of sight may be corrected by the
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