pted at the second Peace Conference, and also
at the Naval Conference of London, namely, the enactment of laws so
limited in duration to a period of years, that at the expiry of the
period every participant state can withdraw. In this way, for example,
it was agreed that the law about the International Prize Court and the
Declaration of London should only be in force for twelve years, and that
any of the powers which were parties thereto might withdraw twelve
months before the expiry of that period, and that, if and as far as no
withdrawal ensued, these laws should from time to time be continued in
force automatically for a further period of six years. This kind of
international legislation, with its time limit and the right of
denunciation, is to be recommended wherever more or less hazardous
legislative experiments are being made, or where interests are at stake
which in course of time are liable to such an alteration as obliges
states to insist on the amendment or repeal of the previously made law.
For example, the International Prize Court as a whole, and its
composition, constitution, and procedure in particular, form an
unparalleled experiment. But the fact that its institution is only to be
agreed on for a period of twelve years facilitates its general
acceptance, because of the possibility of either abrogating it
altogether, or of reforming it, should experience show this to be
necessary.

[Sidenote: International legislation no longer to be left to mere
chance.]

41. However this may be, one point must be decisively
emphasized,--international legislation can no longer be left to mere
chance. Apart from the Declaration of London and the Geneva Convention,
it has always hitherto been a more or less happy chance which has
controlled international legislation. Of conscious legislative
consideration and deliberation, based on far-reaching, thoroughgoing
preparation, there is no trace. For example, the Declaration of Paris of
1856 was but a by-product of the Peace of Paris of the same year. So
also the legislation of the first Peace Conference was simply due to the
anxiety to accomplish something positive which might conceal the fact
that the proposed aim of the Conference--general disarmament, to
wit--had in no wise been realized. At the second Peace Conference we did
indeed see individual states appear with some well-prepared projects of
legislation, but the preparation was entirely one-sided on the part of
th