ranch of law, have had the training required of members of
the highest state judiciary, and have been tested in practice. Let men
be chosen who are masters not only of their own language and of French,
but also of some other of the most widely diffused languages, and who
possess an acquaintance with foreign legal systems. If this be done, all
danger will be avoided. Judges so selected will speedily adapt
themselves to the _milieu_ of the international court and be laid hold
of by it, and their equipment for their task completed. As things are at
present, the institution of an international court is an unheard-of
experiment. But the experiment must be made at some time, and the hope
may be confidently entertained that it will be successful. Petty
considerations based on the weakness of humanity and doubts as to the
sincerity of the efforts of states to submit themselves voluntarily to
international tribunals must be silenced. Fear of international
entanglements and groupings is misplaced. National prejudices and
rivalries must keep in the background. The big state's disdain of the
little state and the little state's mistrust of the big state must give
place to mutual respect. Opposed to the hope and confidence that the
experiment will succeed there are no considerations other than those
which have been arrayed against every step forward in international
life. They will disappear like clouds when the sun of success has once
begun to shine upon the activity of the International Court.

[Sidenote: International courts of appeal a necessity.]

62. Obviously it will not be possible in the long run to stop at a
single international court; the erection over the court of first
instance of an international court of appeal is also a necessity. The
proposed Prize Court will indeed be itself a court of appeal because it
cannot be approached until one or two national courts have spoken. But
the proposed International Court of Justice would be a court of first
instance. Now there are no infallible first-instance decisions. Even
courts are fallible and make mistakes. If this is universally recognized
for municipal administration of justice, it must be recognized for
international administration of justice, all the more as public and not
private interests are then in issue. If states are to feel bound to rely
on their right rather than on their might, and to submit it to a
judicial decision, it must be possible to carry an appeal agai