of Paris, to which some states still refuse
assent. History also teaches us that the general law of nations has a
tendency gradually to become the universal law of nations. It is
therefore permissible, when a forward step which fails to gain unanimous
approval has become a practical matter, for that majority of states
which is ready for it to take the step by themselves; the dissenting
states will give in their adhesion in course of time. And if and when
this should turn out not to be the case, such a majority resolution
would anyhow represent, in a narrower circle of international society, a
step forward from which there is no obligation to forbear merely because
others are unwilling to join in taking it.

[Sidenote: Absence of any executive power.]

29. This constitution, finally, makes no provision for any kind of
executive power, and so it avoids the proposal to set up in
international society an organization resembling that of a state. All
proposals for an international executive authority run counter not only
to the idea of sovereignty, but also to the ideal of international peace
and of international law. The aim of this development is not the
coercion of recalcitrant states, but a condition of things in which
there are no recalcitrant states because every state has freely
submitted to the obligation to refer disputes to the international
tribunals and to abide by their decision. It is just in this respect
that the international community of states differs for all time from the
community of individuals who are united into a state, the latter
requiring as _ultima ratio_ executive compulsion on the part of a
central power, while the former consistently with its nature and
definition can never possess such a central power. It will, we must
confess, call for a long development before such a condition of things
is realized, and, until this realization is effected, war will not
disappear but will remain an historic necessity.

CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION

[Sidenote: Quasi-legislation within the domain of international law.]

30. When we speak of legislation we have in view as a rule a state,
wherein there is a law-making power which acts without reference to the
consent of individual subjects. For even if in a constitutional state an
individual does anyhow exercise so much influence upon legislation as
comes from voting at the election of members of parliament, still he has
no direct influen