d, and this illegal organization, in the
character of Confederate States, was already invoking recognition, aid,
and intervention from foreign powers.

Finding this condition of things and believing it to be an imperative
duty upon the incoming Executive to prevent, if possible, the
consummation of such attempt to destroy the Federal Union, a choice of
means to that end became indispensable. This choice was made, and was
declared in the inaugural address. The policy chosen looked to the
exhaustion of all peaceful measures before a resort to any stronger
ones. It sought only to hold the public places and property not already
wrested from the Government and to collect the revenue, relying for the
rest on time, discussion, and the ballot box. It promised a continuance
of the mails at Government expense to the very people who were resisting
the Government, and it gave repeated pledges against any disturbance to
any of the people or any of their rights. Of all that which a President
might constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, everything was
forborne without which it was believed possible to keep the Government
on foot.

On the 5th of March, the present incumbent's first full day in office,
a letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the
28th of February and received at the War Department on the 4th of March,
was by that Department placed in his hands. This letter expressed the
professional opinion of the writer that reenforcements could not be
thrown into that fort within the time for his relief rendered necessary
by the limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding
possession of the same, with a force of less than 20,000 good and
well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers
of his command, and their memoranda on the subject were made inclosures
of Major Anderson's letter. The whole was immediately laid before
Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in
opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with
other officers, both of the Army and the Navy, and at the end of four
days came reluctantly, but decidedly, to the same conclusion as before.
He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient force was then
at the control of the Government or could be raised and brought to
the ground within the time when the provisions in the fort would be
exhausted. In a purely military point of view this reduced the d