my and Navy.
These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under
what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting
then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed
that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of
Congress.

Soon after the first call for militia it was considered a duty to
authorize the Commanding General in proper cases, according to his
discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_,
or, in other words, to arrest and detain without resort to the ordinary
processes and forms of law such individuals as he might deem dangerous
to the public safety. This authority has purposely been exercised but
very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has
been done under it are questioned, and the attention of the country has
been called to the proposition that one who is sworn to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed" should not himself violate them. Of
course some consideration was given to the questions of power and
propriety before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which
were required to be faithfully executed were being resisted and failing
of execution in nearly one-third of the States. Must they be allowed to
finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the
use of the means necessary to their execution some single law, made in
such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that practically it
relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to a very
limited extent be violated? To state the question more directly, Are
all the laws _but one_ to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go
to pieces lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the
official oath be broken if the Government should be overthrown when it
was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it?
But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not
believed that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitution
that "the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ shall not be
suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety may require it" is equivalent to a provision--is a
provision--that such privilege may be suspended when, in cases of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety _does_ require it. It was
decided that we have a case of rebellion and that the public safety does
require t