of the child from his father's obedience is
not left to the option of the child himself: for, if the wife of a Roman
Catholic should choose to change her religion, from that moment she
deprives her husband of all management and direction of his children,
and even of all the tender satisfaction which a parent can feel in their
society, and which is the only indemnification he can have for all his
cares and sorrows; and they are to be torn forever, at the earliest age,
from his house and family: for the Lord Chancellor is not only
authorized, but he is strongly required, to take away all his children
from such Popish parent, to appoint where, in what manner, and by whom
they are to be educated; and the father is compelled to pay, not for the
ransom, but for the deprivation of his children, and to furnish such a
sum as the Chancellor thinks proper to appoint for their education to
the age of eighteen years. The case is the same, if the husband should
be the conformist; though how the law is to operate in this case I do
not see: for the act expressly says, that the child shall be taken from
such Popish parent; and whilst such husband and wife cohabit, it will be
impossible to put it into execution without taking the child from one as
well as from the other; and then the effect of the law will be, that, if
either husband or wife becomes Protestant, both are to be deprived of
their children.

The paternal power thus being wholly abrogated, it is evident that by
the last regulation the power of an husband over his wife is also
considerably impaired; because, if it be in her power, whenever she
pleases, to subtract the children from his protection and obedience, she
herself by that hold inevitably acquires a power and superiority over
her husband.

But she is not left dependent upon this oblique influence: for, if in
any marriage settlement the husband has reserved to him a power of
making a jointure, and he dies without settling any, her conformity
executes his powers, and executes them in as large extent as the
Chancellor thinks fit. The husband is deprived of that coercive power
over his wife which he had in his hands by the use he might make of the
discretionary power reserved in the settlement.

But if no such power had been reserved, and no such settlement existed,
yet, if the husband dies, leaving his conforming wife without a filed
provision by some settlement on his real estate, his wife may apply to
Chancery, where