ngs are
essentially requisite: first, a proper and sufficient human power to
declare and modify the matter of the law; and next, such a fit and
equitable constitution as they have a right to declare and render
binding. With regard to the first requisite, the human authority, it is
their judgment they give up, not their right. The people, indeed, are
presumed to consent to whatever the legislature ordains for their
benefit; and they are to acquiesce in it, though they do not clearly see
into the propriety of the means by which they are conducted to that
desirable end. This they owe as an act of homage and just deference to a
reason which the necessity of government has made superior to their own.
But though the means, and indeed the nature, of a public advantage may
not always be evident to the understanding of the subject, no one is so
gross and stupid as not to distinguish between a benefit and an injury.
No one can imagine, then, an exclusion of a great body of men, not from
favors, privileges, and trusts, but from the common advantages of
society, can ever be a thing intended for their good, or can ever be
ratified by any implied consent of theirs. If, therefore, at least an
implied human consent is necessary to the existence of a law, such a
constitution cannot in propriety be a law at all.

But if we could suppose that such a ratification was made, not
virtually, but actually, by the people, not representatively, but even
collectively, still it would be null and void. They have no right to
make a law prejudicial to the whole community, even though the
delinquents in making such an act should be themselves the chief
sufferers by it; because it would be-made against the principle of a
superior law, which it is not in the power of any community, or of the
whole race of man, to alter,--I mean the will of Him who gave us our
nature, and in giving impressed an invariable law upon it. It would be
hard to point out any error more truly subversive of all the order and
beauty, of all the peace and happiness of human society, than the
position, that any body of men have a right to make what laws they
please,--or that laws can derive any authority from their institution
merely, and independent of the quality of the subject-matter. No
arguments of policy, reason of state, or preservation of the
constitution can be pleaded in favor of such a practice. They may,
indeed, impeach the frame of that constitution, but can never touch