s. But if it were true
(as it is not) that the real interest of any part of the community could
be separated from the happiness of the rest, still it would afford no
just foundation for a statute providing exclusively for that interest at
the expense of the other; because it would be repugnant to the essence
of law, which requires that it be made as much as possible for the
benefit of the whole. If this principle be denied or evaded, what ground
have we left to reason on? We must at once make a total change in all
our ideas, and look for a new definition of law. Where to find it I
confess myself at a loss. If we resort to the fountains of
jurisprudence, they will not supply us with any that is for our purpose.
"_Jus_" (says Paulus) "_pluribus modis dicitur: uno modo, cum id, quod
semper aequum et bonum est, jus dicitur, ut est jus naturale"_;--this
sense of the word will not be thought, I imagine, very applicable to our
penal laws;--"_altero modo, quod omnibus aut pluribus in unaquaque
civitate utile est, ut est jus civile_." Perhaps this latter will be as
insufficient, and would rather seem a censure and condemnation of the
Popery Acts than a definition that includes them; and there is no other
to be found in the whole Digest; neither are there any modern writers
whose ideas of law are at all narrower.

It would be far more easy to heap up authorities on this article than to
excuse the prolixity and tediousness of producing any at all in proof of
a point which, though too often practically denied, is in its theory
almost self-evident. For Suarez, handling this very question, _Utrum de
ratione et substantia legis esse ut propter commune bonum feratur_, does
not hesitate a moment, finding no ground in reason or authority to
render the affirmative in the least degree disputable: "_In quaestione
ergo proposita"_ (says he) "_nulla est inter authores controversia; sed
omnium commune est axioma de substantia et ratione legis esse, ut pro
communi bono feratur; ita ut propter illud praecipue tradatur_"; having
observed in another place, "_Contra omnem rectitudinem est bonum commune
ad privatum ordinare, seu totum ad partem propter ipsum referre_."
Partiality and law are contradictory terms. Neither the merits nor the
ill deserts, neither the wealth and importance nor the indigence and
obscurity, of the one part or of the other, can make any alteration in
this fundamental truth. On any other scheme, I defy any man living to
sett