oil of his rearing,
to say nothing of outlays for support and education. This provision is,
with the mass of mankind, indispensable to the preservation of the
family state. The child, in helping his parents, helps
himself--increases a common stock, in which he has a share; while his
most faithful services do but acknowledge a debt that money cannot
cancel.

10. _Bondage for crime._ Must innocence be punished because guilt
suffers penalties? True, the criminal works for the government without
pay; and well he may. He owes the government. A century's work would not
pay its drafts on him. He is a public defaulter, and will die so.
Because laws make men pay their debts, shall those be forced to pay who
owe nothing? The law makes no criminal, PROPERTY. It restrains his
liberty, and makes him pay something, a mere penny in the pound, of his
debt to the government; but it does not make him a chattel. Test it. To
own property, is to own its product. Are children born of convicts,
government property? Besides, can _property_ be guilty? Are chattels
punished?

11. _Restraints upon freedom._ Children are restrained by
parents--pupils, by teachers--patients, by physicians--corporations, by
charters--and legislatures, by constitutions. Embargoes, tariffs,
quarantine, and all other laws, keep men from doing as they please.
Restraints are the web of society, warp and woof. Are they slavery? then
civilized society is a giant slave--a government of LAW, _the climax of
slavery,_ and its executive, a king among slaveholders.

12. _Compulsory service._ A juryman is empannelled against his will, and
sit he must. A sheriff orders his posse; bystanders _must_ turn in. Men
are _compelled_ to remove nuisances, pay fines and taxes, support their
families, and "turn to the right as the law directs," however much
against their wills. Are they therefore slaves? To confound slavery with
involuntary service is absurd. Slavery is a _condition_. The slave's
_feelings_ toward it, are one thing; the condition itself, is another
thing; his feelings cannot alter the nature of that condition. Whether
he desires or detests it, the condition remains the same. The slave's
willingness to be a slave is no palliation of the slaveholder's guilt.
Suppose the slave should think himself a chattel, and consent to be so
regarded by others, does that _make_ him a chattel, or make those
guiltless who _hold_ him as such? I may be sick of life, and I tell the
assassin