on Thursday, a watch
was kept upon the family living there. But in the interval between the
corps breaking camp to move out to Slocum's support on Friday morning,
and its return to the old position, some of the women had disappeared.
This fact was specially noted by Gen. Howard.

However the information was procured, the Federal right was doubtless
ascertained to rest on high ground, where it was capable of making
a stubborn resistance towards the south. But Lee well knew that its
position was approached from the west by two broad roads, and reasoned
justly that Hooker, in canvassing the events of Friday, would most
probably look for an attack on his left or front.

Seated on a couple of cracker-boxes, the relics of an issue of Federal
rations the day before, the two Confederate chieftains discussed the
situation. Jackson, with characteristic restless energy, suggested a
movement with his entire corps around Hooker's right flank, to seize
United-States Ford, or fall unawares upon the Army of the Potomac.
This hazardous suggestion, which Lee in his report does not mention
as Jackson's, but which is universally ascribed to him by Confederate
authorities, was one as much fraught with danger as it was spiced with
dash, and decidedly bears the Jacksonian flavor. It gave "the great
flanker" twenty-two thousand men (according to Col. A. S. Pendleton, his
assistant adjutant-general, but twenty-six thousand by morning report)
with which to make a march which must at best take all day, constantly
exposing his own flank to the Federal assault. It separated for a still
longer time the two wings of the Confederate army; leaving Lee with only
Anderson's and McLaws's divisions,--some seventeen thousand men,--with
which to resist the attack of thrice that number, which Hooker, should
he divine this division of forces, could throw against him, the while he
kept Jackson busy with the troops on his own right flank.

On the other hand, Hooker had shown clear intention of fighting a
defensive battle; and perhaps Lee measured his man better than the Army
of the Potomac had done. And he knew Jackson too. Should Hooker remain
quiet during the day, either voluntarily or by Lee's engrossing his
attention by constant activity in his front, the stratagem might
succeed. And in case of failure, each wing had open ground and good
roads for retreat, to form a junction towards Gordonsville.

Moreover, nothing better presented itself; and though, in