his immediate commander, Devens
was left without inspection, counsel, or help. He might have gone in
person to Howard, but he did not dare leave his division. He might have
sent messages which more urgently represented his own anxiety. But when
the blow came, he did all that was possible, and remained, wounded,
in command, and assisted in re-organizing some relics of his division
behind the Buschbeck works.

Schurz was with Howard a good part of the day, and his opinions were
expressed to that officer. To Schurz's personal bearing here, or on any
other occasion, no possible exception can be taken.

XVII. THE CONDUCT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.

There can be no attempt to gainsay that the Eleventh Corps, on
this luckless Saturday, did not do its whole duty. That it was
panic-stricken, and that it decamped from a field where as a corps it
had not fought, is undeniable. But portions of the corps did fight,
and the entire corps would doubtless have fought well under favorable
circumstances. It is but fair, after casting upon the corps the
aspersion of flight from before the enemy, to do it what justice is
possible, and to palliate the bad conduct of the whole by bearing
testimony to the good conduct of some of its parts.

It has been called a German corps. This is not quite exact. Of nearly
thirteen thousand men in the corps, only forty-five hundred were
Germans. But it must be admitted that so many officers high in rank
were of that nationality, that the general tendency and feeling were
decidedly unlike the rest of the army. Moreover, there is not wanting
testimony to show that there were some who wore shoulder-straps in the
corps who gave evidence of having taken up the profession of arms to
make money, and not to fight.

The artillery of the corps did well. Those general officers who most
severely rebuke the conduct of the corps, all say a word in favor of
the service of the guns. Dilger, on the road, just at Buschbeck's line,
fired with his own hands from his last gun a round of canister when the
Confederates were within a dozen yards. Most of the guns had been well
served, but had been sent to the rear in time to save them from capture.

The reserve artillery did its duty, nor limbered up until the
Confederate line had outflanked its position, rendered it useless, and
jeopardized its safety.

All the guns that were saved were put into action an hour later, and did
effective service on the Fairview crest, i