o do good service. Had it been tested, it would, in all probability,
have fought well.

The loss of the corps was one-quarter of its effective.

Some time after the battle of Chancellorsville, a motion was made to
break up the Eleventh Corps, and distribute its regiments among the
others; but it was not done. Hooker then remarked that he would yet
make that corps fight, and be proud of its name. And it subsequently did
sterling service. Gen. Thomas remarked, in congratulating Hooker on
his victory at Lookout Mountain, that "the bayonet-charge of Howard's
troops, made up the side of a steep and difficult hill, over two hundred
feet high, completely routing and driving the enemy from his barricades
on its top,... will rank with the most distinguished feats of arms of
this war." And it is asserted that this encomium was well earned, and
that no portion of it need be set down to encouragement.

In their evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker
and Sickles both testify that the panic of the Eleventh Corps produced
a gap in the line, and that this was the main cause of disaster on this
field. But the fatal gap was made long before the Eleventh Corps was
attacked. It was Hooker's giddy blunder in ordering away, two miles in
their front, the entire line from Dowdall's to Chancellorsville, that
made it.

This was the gap which enabled Jackson to push his advance to within a
few hundred yards of Chancellorsville before he could be arrested. This
was what made it possible for him to join his right to Lee's left wing
next day. Had Hooker but kept his troops in hand, so as to have moved up
Birney sharply in support, to have thrown forward Berry and Whipple if
required, the Confederate advance would, in all human probability,
have been checked at Dowdall's; Lee and Jackson would still have been
separated by a distance of two miles; and of this perilous division
excellent advantage could have yet been taken at daylight Sunday by the
Army of the Potomac.

Hooker's testimony includes the following attempt to disembarrass
himself of the onus of the faulty position of the Eleventh Corps and
its consequences: "No pickets appear to have been thrown out; and I have
reason to suppose that no effort was made by the commander of the
corps on the right to follow up and keep himself advised of Jackson's
movements, although made in broad daylight, and with his full knowledge.
In this way the Eleventh Corps was lost to m