volent actions we can give a straightforward account by
their tendency to promote happiness. For the explanation of justice, on
the other hand, we have to go a long way round. No man is indignant
with a thief because he has not promoted the greatest happiness of
the greatest number, but because he has done him a wrong. There is an
immeasurable interval between a crime against property or life, and the
omission of an act of charity or benevolence. Yet of this interval the
utilitarian theory takes no cognizance. The greatest happiness principle
strengthens our sense of positive duties towards others, but weakens
our recognition of their rights. To promote in every way possible the
happiness of others may be a counsel of perfection, but hardly seems
to offer any ground for a theory of obligation. For admitting that our
ideas of obligation are partly derived from religion and custom, yet
they seem also to contain other essential elements which cannot be
explained by the tendency of actions to promote happiness. Whence comes
the necessity of them? Why are some actions rather than others which
equally tend to the happiness of mankind imposed upon us with the
authority of law? 'You ought' and 'you had better' are fundamental
distinctions in human thought; and having such distinctions, why should
we seek to efface and unsettle them?

Bentham and Mr. Mill are earnest in maintaining that happiness includes
the happiness of others as well as of ourselves. But what two notions
can be more opposed in many cases than these? Granting that in a perfect
state of the world my own happiness and that of all other men would
coincide, in the imperfect state they often diverge, and I cannot truly
bridge over the difficulty by saying that men will always find pleasure
in sacrificing themselves or in suffering for others. Upon the greatest
happiness principle it is admitted that I am to have a share, and in
consistency I should pursue my own happiness as impartially as that of
my neighbour. But who can decide what proportion should be mine and what
his, except on the principle that I am most likely to be deceived in my
own favour, and had therefore better give the larger share, if not all,
to him?

Further, it is admitted that utility and right coincide, not in
particular instances, but in classes of actions. But is it not
distracting to the conscience of a man to be told that in the particular
case they are opposed? Happiness is said to be th