cease to be identified with her:--Am I not
right?
PROTARCHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the
kinds of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more
clearly as we proceed.
PROTARCHUS: Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose.
SOCRATES: But, let us first agree on some little points.
PROTARCHUS: What are they?
SOCRATES: Is the good perfect or imperfect?
PROTARCHUS: The most perfect, Socrates, of all things.
SOCRATES: And is the good sufficient?
PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things.
SOCRATES: And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt
after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and
care not for the attainment of anything which is not accompanied by
good.
PROTARCHUS: That is undeniable.
SOCRATES: Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of
wisdom, and pass them in review.
PROTARCHUS: How do you mean?
SOCRATES: Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any
pleasure in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good,
it cannot be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want
anything, then it cannot really be the chief good.
PROTARCHUS: Impossible.
SOCRATES: And will you help us to test these two lives?
PROTARCHUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then answer.
PROTARCHUS: Ask.
SOCRATES: Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in
the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?
PROTARCHUS: Certainly I should.
SOCRATES: Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to
you if you had perfect pleasure?
PROTARCHUS: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and
forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want
sight?
PROTARCHUS: Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.
SOCRATES: Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the
greatest pleasures?
PROTARCHUS: I should.
SOCRATES: But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge,
nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of
whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of
intelligence.
PROTARCHUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect
that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of
the pleasure which you feel at any moment r
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