g is termed
consciousness. And memory is the preservation of consciousness, and
reminiscence is the recovery of consciousness. Now the memory of
pleasure, when a man is in pain, is the memory of the opposite of his
actual bodily state, and is therefore not in the body, but in the mind.
And there may be an intermediate state, in which a person is balanced
between pleasure and pain; in his body there is want which is a cause of
pain, but in his mind a sure hope of replenishment, which is pleasant.
(But if the hope be converted into despair, he has two pains and not
a balance of pain and pleasure.) Another question is raised: May not
pleasures, like opinions, be true and false? In the sense of being real,
both must be admitted to be true: nor can we deny that to both of them
qualities may be attributed; for pleasures as well as opinions may be
described as good or bad. And though we do not all of us allow that
there are true and false pleasures, we all acknowledge that there are
some pleasures associated with right opinion, and others with
falsehood and ignorance. Let us endeavour to analyze the nature of this
association.

Opinion is based on perception, which may be correct or mistaken. You
may see a figure at a distance, and say first of all, 'This is a man,'
and then say, 'No, this is an image made by the shepherds.' And you
may affirm this in a proposition to your companion, or make the remark
mentally to yourself. Whether the words are actually spoken or not,
on such occasions there is a scribe within who registers them, and a
painter who paints the images of the things which the scribe has written
down in the soul,--at least that is my own notion of the process; and
the words and images which are inscribed by them may be either true
or false; and they may represent either past, present, or future. And,
representing the future, they must also represent the pleasures and
pains of anticipation--the visions of gold and other fancies which are
never wanting in the mind of man. Now these hopes, as they are termed,
are propositions, which are sometimes true, and sometimes false; for the
good, who are the friends of the gods, see true pictures of the future,
and the bad false ones. And as there may be opinion about things which
are not, were not, and will not be, which is opinion still, so there may
be pleasure about things which are not, were not, and will not be, which
is pleasure still,--that is to say, false pleasure; a