merican Expeditionary Force
deserves for the Allied military victory of 1918. Previous to June the
military contribution of the United States had no material effects. The
defense of Chateau-Thierry at the beginning of the month and the
operations there and at Belleau Woods had, however, important practical
as well as moral effects. The fighting was of a purely local character,
but it came at a critical moment and at a critical spot. It was a crisis
when the importance of standing firm could not be overestimated, and the
defensive capacity of the French had been seriously weakened. The advance
of American divisions with the French in the clearing of the Marne sector
was of the first military importance. The Americans were better qualified
than any European troops, at that stage of the war, to carry through
offensive operations. They were fearless not merely because of natural
hardihood, but through ignorance of danger; they were fresh and
undefeated, physically and morally capable of undergoing the gruelling
punishment delivered by the rearguards of the retreating Germans; their
training had been primarily for open warfare. The same qualities were
essential for the arduous and deadly task of breaking the German line in
the Argonne, which was the finishing blow on the western battlefields.

The defects of the American armies have been emphasized by European
experts. They point especially to the faulty staff-work, apparent in the
Argonne particularly, which resulted in heavy losses. Staff-officers in
numerous instances seem to have been ill-trained and at times positively
unequal to the exigencies of the campaign. Mistakes in selection account
for this to some degree, for men were appointed who were not equipped
temperamentally or intellectually for the positions given them. Equally
frequent were mistakes in the distribution of staff-officers. It is a
notable fact, however, that such mistakes resulted from inexperience and
ignorance and not from the intrusion of politics. President Wilson
guaranteed to General Pershing complete immunity from the pleas of
politicians and in no war fought by the United States have political
factors played a role of such insignificance.

Finally, and aside from the fighting qualities of the rank and file and
certain defects of the higher command, the Americans represented numbers;
and without the tremendous numerical force transported to Europe in the
spring and summer, the plans of Foch coul