of Nations and a plebiscite at the end of fifteen
years was to determine its final destiny. The territory on the left bank
of the Rhine was left to Germany, but it was to be demilitarized
entirely, a condition which also applied to a zone fifty kilometers broad
to the east of the Rhine. The bridgeheads on the Rhine, as well as the
German districts to the west of the river, were to be occupied for
periods extending from five to fifteen years, in order to ensure the
execution of the treaty by the Germans. The French press contended that
Clemenceau had made over-great concessions, protesting that the League
would be utterly unable to protect France against sudden attack,
especially since the Covenant had not provided for a general military
force. In return for these concessions by Clemenceau, Wilson gave an
extraordinary _quid pro quo_. He who had declaimed vigorously against all
special alliances now agreed that until the League was capable of
offering to France the protection she asked, there should be a separate
treaty between France, Great Britain, and the United States, according to
which the two latter powers should promise to come to the defense of
France in case of sudden and unprovoked attack by Germany. The treaty
did not, according to Wilson, constitute a definite alliance but merely
an "undertaking," but it laid him open to the charge of serious
inconsistency.

Thus was passed, by means of compromise, the most serious crisis of the
Conference. In France Wilson never recovered the popularity which he then
lost by his opposition to French demands. In many quarters of Great
Britain and the United States, on the other hand, he was attacked by
liberals for having surrendered to the forces of reaction. In the
Conference, however, he had maintained his prestige, and most moderates
who understood the situation felt that he had done as well as or better
than could be expected. He had by no means had his way in the matter of
reparations or frontiers, but he had gone far towards a vindication of
his principles by avoiding a defeat under circumstances where the odds
were against him. More he probably could not have obtained and no other
American at that time could have secured so much. The sole alternative
would have been for the American delegates to withdraw from the
Conference. Such a step might have had the most disastrous consequences.
It was true, or Europe believed it to be true, that the Conference
represented for