nter of the French armies, west of Rheims,
was to drive the enemy beyond the Aisne, while the Americans were to
attack through the Argonne and on both sides of the Meuse, aiming for
Sedan. Pershing was given his choice of the Champagne or Argonne sectors,
and chose the latter, which was the more difficult, insisting that no
other Allied troops possessed the offensive spirit which would be
necessary for success. In the meantime a new American army was to be
organized, to operate south of Verdun and against Metz, in the spring of
1919; in fact this was designed to be the chief American effort. As
matters turned out this second American army was ready to make its
offensive early in November, but in September none of the Allied chiefs
expressed the opinion that the final victory could be achieved in 1918.
Such were the difficulties of terrain in the Argonne advance that the
French did not believe that the attack could be pushed much beyond
Montfaucon, between the forest and the Meuse, before winter forced a
cessation of active operations.

The defensive importance of the Argonne for the Germans could hardly be
overestimated, for if the railway line running through Sedan and Mezieres
were severed, they would be cut in two by the Ardennes and would be
unable to withdraw from France the bulk of their forces, which, left
without supplies, would suffer inevitable disaster. As a consequence the
Argonne had been strengthened by elaborate fortifications which, taken in
conjunction with the natural terrain, densely wooded, covered with rugged
heights, and marked by ridges running east and west, made it apparently
impregnable. The dense undergrowth, the bowlders, and the ravines offered
ideal spots for machine-gun nests. The Germans had the exact range of
each important position.

But Pershing's confidence in the offensive valor of the Americans was
amply justified. On the morning of the 26th of September the initial
attack was delivered, the main force of the blow falling east of the
forest, where the natural strength of the enemy positions was less
formidable. By noon of the second day Montfaucon was captured, and by the
29th all the immediate objectives of the attack were secured. Losses were
heavy, staff work was frequently open to severe criticism, communications
were broken at times, the infantry had not always received adequate
artillery support, but the success of the drive was undeniable. Before the
American troops, however