perhaps, from his Scotch blood and partly from
his academic training. Except for his steadfast adherence to what he
regards as basic principles, he might rightly be termed an opportunist.
For he is prone to temporize, anxious to prevent an issue from approaching
a crisis, evidently in the hope that something may "turn up" to improve
the situation and obviate the necessity of conflict. "Watchful waiting" in
the Mexican crises and his attitude towards the belligerents during the
first two years of the European war are cases in point. There are
instances of impulsive action on his part, when he has not waited for
advice or troubled to acquire exact knowledge of the facts underlying a
situation, but such occasions have been infrequent.
Wilson's dislike of advice has been widely advertized. It is probably
closer to the truth to say that he is naturally suspicious of advisers
unless he is certain that their basic point of view is the same as his
own. This is quite different from saying that he wants only opinions that
coincide with his own and that he immediately dispenses with advisers who
disagree with him. Colonel House, for example, who for five years exerted
constant influence on his policy, frequently advanced opinions quite at
variance from those of the President, but such differences did not weaken
House's influence inasmuch as Wilson felt that they were both starting
from the same angle towards the same point. Prejudiced though he seemed
to be against "financiers," Wilson took the opinions of Thomas W. Lamont
at Paris, because the underlying object of both, the acquisition of a
secure peace, was identical. It is true, however, that with the exception
of Colonel House, Wilson's advisers have been in the main purveyors of
facts rather than colleagues in the formation of policies. Wilson has
generally been anxious to receive facts which might help him to build his
policy, as will be attested by those who worked with him at Paris.[1] But
he was less interested in the opinions of his advisers, especially when
it came to principles and not details, for he decides principles for
himself. In this sense his Cabinet was composed of subordinates rather
than counselors. Such an attitude is, of course, characteristic of most
modern executives and has been intensified by war conditions. The summary
disregard of Lansing, shown by Wilson at Paris, was less striking than
the snubbing of Balfour by Lloyd George, or the cold brutality
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