o drive Paganism from the Holy Land, but
Quakers would never have joined in any of the crusades for its
expulsion. It has been long esteemed, again, a desideratum in politics,
that among nations, differing in strength and resources, a kind of
balance of power should be kept up, but Quakers would never have engaged
in any one war to preserve it. It has been thought again, that it would
contribute to the happiness of the natives of India, if the blessings of
the British constitution could be given them instead of their own. But
Quakers would never have taken possession of their territories for, the
accomplishment of such a good. It has been long thought again a matter
of great political importance, that our West-Indian settlements should
be cultivated by African labourers. But Quakers would never have
allowed a slave-trade for such a purpose. It has been thought again, and
it is still thought, a desirable thing, that our property should be
secured from the petty depredations of individuals. But Quakers would
never have consented to capital punishments for such an end. In short,
few public evils would have arisen among mankind, if statesmen had
adopted the system, upon which the Quakers reason in political affairs,
or if they had concurred with an ancient Grecian philosopher in
condemning to detestation the memory of the man, who first made a
distinction between expediency and moral right.
[36]That this trait of reasoning upon principle, regardless of the
consequences, is likely to be a feature in the character of the Quakers,
we are warranted in pronouncing, when we discover no less than three
circumstances in the constitution of the Quakers, which may be causes in
producing it.
[Footnote 36: The Sierra Leone Company, which was founded for laudable
purposes, ought have been filled by Quakers; but when they understood
that there was to be a fort and depot of arms in the settlement, they
declined becoming proprietors.]
This trait seems, in the first place, to be the direct and legitimate
offspring of the trait explained in the last chapter. For every time a
Quaker is called upon to bear his testimony by suffering, whether in the
case of a refusal to comply with the laws, or with the customs and
fashions of the land, he is called upon to refer to his own conscience,
against his own temporal interest, and against the opinion of the world.
The moment he gives up principle for policy in the course of his
reasoning upon su
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