ttached to the character of the
Quakers, is that of an obstinate spirit.

This trait is a very ancient one. It was observed in the time of George
Fox, of the members of this society, that they were as "stiff as trees,"
and this idea concerning them has come down to the present day.

The origin of this trait must be obvious to all. The Quakers, as we have
seen, will neither pay tithes, nor perform military service, nor
illuminate their houses, like other people, though they are sure of
suffering by their refusal to comply with custom in these cases. Now,
when individuals, few in number, become singular, and differ from the
world at large, it is generally considered that the majority are in the
right, and that the minority are in the wrong. But obstinacy may be
defined to be a perseverance in that which is generally considered to be
wrong.

This epithet has attached, and will attach to those who resist the
popular opinion, till men are better educated, or till they lose their
prejudices, or have more correct and liberal notions on religion. The
early Christians were themselves accused of obstinacy, and this even by
the enlightened Pliny. He tells, us, that they would not use wine and
frankincense before the statues of the emperors; and that "there was no
question that for such obstinacy they deserved punishment."[39]

[Footnote 39: "Pervicaciam certe et inflexibitem obstinationem debere
puniri."]

In judging of the truth of this trait, two queries will arise. First,
whether the Quakers, in adhering rigidly to those singularities which
have produced it, are really wrong as a body of Christians? And,
secondly, whether they do not conscientiously believe themselves to be
right?

In the case of the early Christians, which has been mentioned, we, who
live at this day, have no doubt that Pliny put a false estimate on their
character. We believe them to have done their duty, and we believe also
that they considered themselves as doing it, when they refused divine
honours to the emperors. And the action, therefore, which Pliny
denominated obstinacy, would, if it had been left to us to name it, have
been called inflexible virtue, as arising out of a sense of the
obligations imposed upon them by the Christian religion.

In the same manner we may argue with respect to the Quakers. Who, for
example, if he will try to divest himself of the prejudices of custom,
and of the policy of the world, feels such a consciousness of his