h by
the idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of the
danger when they escaped therefrom: this renders them secure
afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh.

PROP. XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is
destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain
involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of
another cause: and will be diminished in proportion as we
conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.

Proof.--This Prop. is evident from the mere definition of love
and hatred (III. xiii. note). For pleasure is called love
towards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply in
so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the
other. When this condition of causality is either wholly or
partly removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part
vanishes. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to
be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if
it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.

Proof.--A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. vii.)
be perceived through itself without anything else. If,
therefore, we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we
shall therefore (III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall
do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the
given emotion. But if the thing which causes the emotion be
conceived as acting by necessity, we shall then (by the same Def.
vii. Part I.) conceive it not as the sole cause, but as one of
the causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatred
towards it will be less. Q.E.D.

Note.--Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be
free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards
anything else: to this consideration we must add the imitation
of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.

PROP. L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope
or fear.

Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.

Note.--Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or
fear are called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as such omens
are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of
hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of
pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them
with love or hatred, and endeavour either t