is called
Wonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called
Consternation, because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed
in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to
think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil. If,
however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or
anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is thereby
regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration;
otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c., be what we wonder at,
the emotion is called Horror. Again, if it be the prudence,
industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our
love will on this account be the greater (III. xii.), and when
joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion. We may in
like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other
emotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able
to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in
ordinary speech. Whence it is evident, that the names of the
emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their
ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their
nature.

To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from
the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or
fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears
to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &c.,
we are, in consequence (III. xv. Coroll. and III. xxvii.),
determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing. But if from
the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing,
we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause
of wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the
thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities
which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on
the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more
particularly to regard that which is therein. As devotion
springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision
spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn
from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence.
Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c.,
in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other
emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any
recognized name.

PROP. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of
activity, it feels pleasure: and