y_ or _promissory_ in the _first_ person singular and
plural; _volitive_ in the _second_ and _third_ singular and plural. Thus,
the so-called future is properly divisible into _two_ tenses: the _first_
implying _influence_ or _volition_; the _second_ (or future proper)
_intention_ or _promise_. Thus:

1. 2.

I _will_ go. I _shall_ go.
Thou _shalt_ go. Thou _wilt_ go.
He _shall_ go. He _will_ go.
We _will_ go. We _shall_ go.
You _shall_ go. You _will_ go.
They _shall_ go. They _will_ go.

When the above is thoroughly comprehended by the pupil, it will be only
necessary to impress upon his mind (as a concise rule) the necessity of
making use of a different auxiliary in speaking of the future actions of
_others_, when he wishes to convey the same idea respecting _such actions_
which he has done, or should do, in speaking of his _own_, and _vice
versa_. Thus:

I _will_ go, and you _shall_ accompany me.

(_i. e._ it is my _wish_ to go, and also that you shall accompany me.)

I _shall_ go, and you _will_ accompany me.

(_i. e._ it is my _intention_ to go; and believe, or know, that it is your
_intention_ to accompany me.)

The philosophical reason for this distinction will be evident, when we
reflect upon the various ideas produced in the mind by the expression of
either _volition_ or mere _intention_ (in so far as the latter is
distinguishable from active _will_) with regard to _our own_ future
actions, and the same terms with reference to the future actions of
_others_. It will be seen that a mere _intention_ in the _first_ person,
becomes _influence_ when it extends to the _second_ and _third_; we know
nothing, _a priori_ (as it were) of the _intentions_ of others, except in
so far as we may have the power of _determining_ them. When I say "_I_
shall go" (_j'irai_), I merely express an _intention_ or _promise_ to go;
but if I continue "_You_ and _they_ shall go," I convey the idea that _my_
intention or promise is operative on _you_ and _them_; and the terms which
I thus use become unintentionally influential or expressive of an extension
of _my_ volition to the actions of _others_. Again, the terms which I use
to signify _volition_, with reference to _my own_ actions, are but
_declaratory_ or _promissory_ when I speak of _your_ actions, or those of
_others_. I am conscious of _my own_ wish to go; but _my_ wish not
influencing _you_, I do,