ntary attention. But quite the
opposite may be the case. When called upon, say by his parent, to lay
aside the book and attend to some other problem, the child, it is true,
shows a desire to continue reading. But this may be because he has a
definite aim of his own in view--to find out the fate of his hero. This
is a strongly felt need on his part, and his mind refuses to be
satisfied until, by further attention to the problem before him, he has
attained to this end. The only element of truth in the illustration is
that the child's attention is strongly reinforced through the intense
feeling tone associated with the selected, or determined, aim--the fate
of his hero. The fact is, therefore, that a process of voluntary
attention may have associated with its problem as strong an interest as
is found in the non-voluntary type.

=Voluntary Attention Depends on Problem.=--It is evident from the
foregoing that the characteristic of voluntary attention is not the
absence or the presence of any special degree of interest, but rather
the conception of some end, or purpose, to be reached in and through the
attentive process. In other words, voluntary attention is a state of
mind in which the mental movements are not drifting without a chart, but
are seeking to reach a set haven. A person who is greatly interested in
automobiles, for instance, on seeing a new machine, may allow his
attention to run now to this part of the machine, now to that, as each
attracts him in turn. Here no fixed purpose is being served by the
attentive process, and attention may pass from part to part in a
non-voluntary way, the person's general interest in automobiles being
sufficient to keep the attention upon the subject. Suddenly, however, he
may notice something apparently new in the mechanism of the machine, and
a desire arises to understand its significance. This at once becomes an
end to which the mind desires to attain, and voluntary attention
proceeds to direct the mental movements toward its attainment. To
suppose, however, that the interest, manifest in the former mental
movements, is now absent, would evidently be fallacious. The difference
lies in this, that at first the attention seemed fixed on the object
through a general interest only, and drifted from point to point in a
purposeless way, while in the second case an interesting end, or
purpose, controlled the mental movements, and therefore made each
movement significant in relation to th