per nervous arcs. What is
actually retained, however, is the tendency to reinstate nervous
movements through the same paths as were involved in the original
experience. Although, therefore, retention is usually treated as a
factor in memory, its basis is, in reality, physiological.

=Memory Distinguished from Apperception.=--The distinguishing
characteristics of memory as a re-presentation in the mind of a former
experience is evidently the mental attitude known as recognition.
Memory, in other words, always implies a belief that the present mental
state really represents a fact, or event, which formed a part of our
past experience. In the apperceptive process as seen in an ordinary
process of learning, on the other hand, although it seems to involve a
re-presentation of former mental images in consciousness, this distinct
reference of the revived imagery to past time is evidently wanting.
When, for instance, the mind interprets a strange object as a
pear-shaped, thin-rinded, many-seeded fruit, all these interpreting
ideas are, in a sense, revivals of past experience; yet none carry with
them any distinct reference to past time. In like manner, when I look at
an object of a certain form and colour and say that it is a sweet apple,
it is evidently owing to past experience that I can declare that
particular object to be sweet. It is quite clear, however, that in such
a case there is no distinct reference of the revived image of sweetness
to any definite occurrence in one's former experience. Such an
apperceptive revival, or re-presentation of past experience, because it
includes merely a representation of mental images, but fails to relate
them to the past, cannot be classed as an act of memory.

=But Involves Apperceptive Process.=--While, however, the mere revival
of old knowledge in the apperceptive process does not constitute an act
of memory, memory is itself only a special phase of the apperceptive
process. When I think of a particular anecdote to-day, and say I
remember having the same experience on Sunday evening last, the present
mental images cannot be the very same images as were then experienced.
The former images belonged to the past, while those at present in
consciousness are a new creation, although dependent, as we have seen,
upon certain physiological conditions established in the past. In an act
of memory, therefore, the new presentation, like all new presentations,
must be interpreted in terms of past