hough it does
apply to the pre-school period, and also justifies the claim that with
young children the lesson problem should be closely connected with some
vital interest. It would be useless, for instance, to try to interest
young children in the British North America Act by telling them that the
knowledge will be useful when they come to write on their entrance
examinations. The story of Sir Isaac Brock, on the other hand, wins
attention for itself through the child's patriotism and love of story.
Again, the problem demanding attention should not, in the case of young
children, be too long or complex. For example, a young child might
easily attend to the separate problems of finding out, (1) how many
marbles he must have to give four to James and three to William; (2) how
many times seven can be taken from twenty-eight; (3) how many marbles
James would have if he received four marbles four times; and (4) how
many James would have if he received three marbles three times. But if
given the problem "to divide twenty-eight marbles between James and
William, giving James four every time he gives William three," the
problem may be too complex for his present power of attention. A young
child has not the control over his knowledge necessary to continue any
long process of selecting attention. A relatively short period of
attention to any problem, therefore, exhausts the nervous energy in the
centres connected with a particular set of experiences. It is for this
reason that the lessons in primary classes should be short and varied.
One of the objections, therefore, to a narrow curriculum is that
attention would not obtain needed variety, and that a narrowness in
interest and application may result. On the other hand, it is well to
note that the child must in time learn to concentrate his attention for
longer periods and upon topics possessing only remote, or indirect,
interest.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE FEELING OF INTEREST

=Nature of Feeling.=--Feeling has already been described (Chapter XIX)
as the pleasurable or painful side of any state of consciousness. We
may recall how it was there found that any conscious state, or
experience, for instance, being conscious of the prick of a pin, of
success at an examination, or of the loss of a friend, is not merely a
state of knowledge, or awareness, but is also a state of feeling. It is
a state of feeling because it _affects_ us, that is, because being a
state of _our_ conscio