an
omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.--Another
objection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all distinctions
passing at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction
there would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of
the world, and consequently the new world could not arise with all the
distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which
are actually observed to exist).--A third objection is that, if we
assume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all
works, &c. (which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying
souls which enter into the state of non-difference from the highest
Brahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which have
obtained final release again appear in the new world.--If you finally
say, 'Well, let this world remain distinct from the highest Brahman even
at the time of reabsorption,' we reply that in that case a reabsorption
will not take place at all, and that, moreover, the effect's existing
separate from the cause is not possible.--For all these reasons the
Vedanta doctrine is objectionable.

To this the next Sutra replies.

9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.

There is nothing objectionable in our system.--The objection that the
effect when being reabsorbed into its cause would inquinate the latter
with its qualities does not damage our position 'because there are
parallel instances,' i.e. because there are instances of effects not
inquinating with their qualities the causes into which they are
reabsorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots, &c., which
in their state of separate existence are of various descriptions, do
not, when they are reabsorbed into their original matter (i.e. clay),
impart to the latter their individual qualities; nor do golden ornaments
impart their individual qualities to their elementary material, i.e.
gold, into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the fourfold
complex of organic beings which springs from earth impart its qualities
to the latter at the time of reabsorption. You (i.e. the purvapakshin),
on the other hand, have not any instances to quote in your favour. For
reabsorption could not take place at all if the effect when passing back
into its causal substance continued to subsist there with all its
individual properties. And[272] that in spite of the non-difference of
cause and effect the e