lthough not plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether
illegitimate), maintains that Badari's view, which is expounded first,
represents the siddhanta, while Jaimini's view, set forth subsequently,
is to be considered a mere purvapaksha. This, of course, is altogether
inadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the Vedanta-sutras as
well as the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras to conclude the discussion of
contested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted
as the authoritative one. This is so patent that /S/a@nkara feels
himself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule
(Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any
arguments but such as are valid only if /S/a@nkara's system itself is
already accepted.

The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no choice
but to side with Ramanuja as to the general subject-matter of the fourth
adhyaya of the Sutras. We need not accept him as our guide in all
particular interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that the
Sutras of the fourth adhyaya describe the ultimate fate of one and the
same vidvan, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a higher
and lower knowledge of Brahman in /S/a@nkara's sense.

If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of
Brahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower and a higher Brahman
is likewise not valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on
the negative evidence of the fourth adhyaya, but regarding which the
entire body of the Vedanta-sutras has to be consulted. And intimately
connected with this investigation--in fact, one with it from a certain
point of view--is the question whether the Sutras afford any evidence of
their author having held the doctrine of Maya, the principle of
illusion, by the association with which the highest Brahman, in itself
transcending all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or I/s/vara.
That Ramanuja denies the distinction of the two Brahmans and the
doctrine of Maya we have seen above; we shall, however, in the
subsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and
interpretations than to the indications furnished by the Sutras
themselves.

Placing myself at the point of view of a /S/a@nkara, I am startled at
the outset by the second Sutra of the first adhyaya, which undertakes to
give a definition of Brahman. 'Brahman is that whence the origination
and so on (i.e. the sust