it does not contradict the
Vedanta-texts, is not to be excluded as a means of confirming the
meaning ascertained. Scripture itself, moreover, allows argumentation;
for the passages, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5 ('the Self is to be heard, to be
considered'), and Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2 ('as the man, &c., having been
informed, and being able to judge for himself, would arrive at Gandhara,
in the same way a man who meets with a teacher obtains knowledge'),
declare that human understanding assists Scripture[66].

Scriptural text, &c.[67], are not, in the enquiry into Brahman, the only
means of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i.e. in
the Purva Mima/m/sa), but scriptural texts on the one hand, and
intuition[68], &c., on the other hand, are to be had recourse to
according to the occasion: firstly, because intuition is the final
result of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the
enquiry is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the
knowledge of Brahman were something to be accomplished, there would be
no reference to intuition, and text, &c., would be the only means of
knowledge. The origination of something to be accomplished depends,
moreover, on man since any action either of ordinary life, or dependent
on the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done in a different
way. A man, for instance, may move on either by means of a horse, or by
means of his feet, or by some other means, or not at all. And again (to
quote examples of actions dependent on the Veda), we meet in Scripture
with sentences such as the following: 'At the atiratra he takes the
sho/d/asin cup,' and 'at the atiratra he does not take the sho/d/asin
cup;' or, 'he makes the oblation after the sun has risen,' and, 'he
makes the oblation when the sun has not yet risen.' Just as in the
quoted instances, injunctions and prohibitions, allowances of optional
procedure, general rules and exceptions have their place, so they would
have their place with regard to Brahman also (if the latter were a thing
to be accomplished). But the fact is that no option is possible as to
whether a substance is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. All
option depends on the notions of man; but the knowledge of the real
nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man, but only on the
thing itself. For to think with regard to a post, 'this is a post or a
man, or something else,' is not knowledge of truth; the two ideas, 'it