he other
passage quoted ('as action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not
refer to action is purportless') we remark that if that passage were
taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those
words which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all
information about existent things is meaningless[81]. If, on the other
hand, the Veda--in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation
of activity--does give information about existent things as being
subservient to some action to be accomplished, why then should it not
give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self?
For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become
an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act).--But, it will
be said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are
instrumental to action, the information given about such things is
merely subservient to action.--This, we reply, does not matter; for
although the information may be subservient to action, the things
themselves about which information is given are already intimated
thereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain
actions. Their final end (prayojana) indeed may be subserviency to some
action, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given
about them, intimated in themselves.--Well, and if they are thus
intimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose[82]? We reply that
the information about the Self, which is an existing thing not
comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the
information about other existent things); for by the comprehension of
the Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of
transmigration, and thus a purpose is established which renders the
passages relative to Brahman equal to those passages which give
information about things instrumental to actions. Moreover, there are
found (even in that part of the Veda which treats of actions) such
passages as 'a Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,' which teach abstinence
from certain actions. Now abstinence from action is neither action nor
instrumental to action. If, therefore, the tenet that all those passages
which do not express action are devoid of purport were insisted on, it
would follow that all such passages as the one quoted, which teach
abstinence from action, are devoid of purport--a consequence which is of
course unacceptable. Nor, again, can the co