f the world.--For these reasons the doctrine of
the atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.

13. And because in consequence of samavaya being admitted a regressus in
infinitum results from parity of reasoning.

You (the Vai/s/eshika) admit that a binary compound which originates
from two atoms, while absolutely different from them, is connected with
them by the relation of inherence; but on that assumption the doctrine
of the atoms being the general cause cannot be established, 'because
parity involves here a retrogressus ad infinitum.' For just as a binary
compound which is absolutely different from the two constituent atoms is
connected with them by means of the relation of inherence (samavaya), so
the relation of inherence itself being absolutely different from the two
things which it connects, requires another relation of inherence to
connect it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases. For
this second relation of inherence again, a third relation of inherence
would have to be assumed and so on ad infinitum.--But--the Vai/s/eshika
is supposed to reply--we are conscious of the so-called samavaya
relation as eternally connected with the things between which it exists,
not as either non-connected with them or as depending on another
connexion; we are therefore not obliged to assume another connexion, and
again another, and so on, and thus to allow ourselves to be driven into
a regressus in infinitum.--Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it
would involve the admission that conjunction (sa/m/yoga) also as being
eternally connected with the things which it joins does, like samavaya,
not require another connexion[364]. If you say that conjunction does
require another connexion because it is a different thing[365] we reply
that then samavaya also requires another connexion because it is
likewise a different thing. Nor can you say that conjunction does
require another connexion because it is a quality (gu/n/a), and samavaya
does not because it is not a quality; for (in spite of this difference)
the reason for another connexion being required is the same in both
cases[366], and not that which is technically called 'quality' is the
cause (of another connexion being required)[367].--For these reasons
those who acknowledge samavaya to be a separate existence are driven
into a regressus in infinitum, in consequence of which, the
impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire