s/eshikas admit to have colour, &c. must have causes compared to
which they are gross and non-permanent. Hence that reason also which
Ka/n/ada gives for the permanence of the atoms (IV, 1, 1, 'that which
exists without having a cause is permanent') does not apply at all to
the atoms because, as we have shown just now, the atoms are to be
considered as having a cause.--The second reason also which Ka/n/ada
brings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in IV, 1, 4, 'the
special negation implied in the term non-eternal would not be
possible[368]' (if there did not exist something eternal, viz. the
atoms), does not necessarily prove the permanency of the atoms; for
supposing that there exists not any permanent thing, the formation of a
negative compound such as 'non-eternal' is impossible. Nor does the
existence of the word 'non-permanent' absolutely presuppose the
permanency of atoms; for there exists (as we Vedantins maintain) another
permanent ultimate Cause, viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of
anything be established merely on the ground of a word commonly being
used in that sense, since there is room for common use only if word and
matter are well-established by some other means of right knowledge.--The
third reason also given in the Vai/s/. Sutras (IV, 1, 5) for the
permanency of the atoms ('and Nescience') is unavailing. For if we
explain that Sutra to mean 'the non-perception of those actually
existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience,' it would follow
that the binary atomic compounds also are permanent[369]. And if we
tried to escape from that difficulty by including (in the explanation of
the Sutra as given above) the qualification 'there being absence of
(originating) substances,' then nothing else but the absence of a cause
would furnish the reason for the permanency of the atoms, and as that
reason had already been mentioned before (in IV, 1, 1) the Sutra IV, 1,
5 would be a useless restatement.--Well, then (the Vai/s/eshika might
say), let us understand by 'Nescience' (in the Sutra) the impossibility
of conceiving a third reason of the destruction (of effects), in
addition to the division of the causal substance into its parts, and the
destruction of the causal substance; which impossibility involves the
permanency of the atoms[370].--There is no necessity, we reply, for
assuming that a thing when perishing must perish on account of either of
those two reasons. That assumption would indeed ha