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nt out that, if he means thereby that Nescience and so on cannot exist without aggregates and hence require the existence of such, it remains to assign an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already shown--when examining the Vaijeshika doctrine--that the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for even on the assumption of permanent atoms and individual souls in which the ad/ri/sh/t/a abides[392]; how much less then are aggregates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i.e. souls), and that which abides in them (the ad/ri/sh/t/a).--Let us then assume (the Bauddha says) that Nescience, &c. themselves are the efficient cause of the aggregate.--But how--we ask--can they be the cause of that without which--as their abode--they themselves are not capable of existence? Perhaps you will say that in the eternal sa/m/sara the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain, and hence also Nescience, and so on, which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled rule, it may produce either a like or an unlike one. In the former case a human body could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the infernal regions; in the latter case a man might in an instant be turned into an elephant or a god and again become a man; either of which consequences would be contrary to your system.--Moreover, that for the purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is formed is, according to your doctrine, not a permanent enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves itself merely and cannot be desired by anything else; hence final release also must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself only, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If a being desirous of both were assumed, it would have to be conceived as permanently existing up to the time of enjoyment and release, and that would be contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency.--There may therefore exist a causal relation between the members of the series consisting of Nescience, &c., but, in the absence of a permanent enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on that ground the existence of aggregates. 20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, &c.), because on the origination of the subsequent (momen
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