rsation was the revolution that would come after the war. This
was discussed as openly as the problems of war; the two were bound up
together, first a successful ending of the war, and then a change in
government.

This public denunciation and open discussion of a _coup d'etat_ came
as a shock to me, for I remembered quite vividly how the same people
cheered the Emperor when he declared war. Three years ago no one would
have dared to talk like that. To be sure enough was said then of
the desirability of a more liberal government, but it was a far-off
question, one that the next generation might have to deal with. Now the
talk was of an overturn immediately after the war.

The court circle was not ignorant of what was being said for the spies
kept them fully informed. In conversation with a journalist two months
before the outbreak of the revolution, the Minister of the Interior,
Protopopov, a protege of Rasputin, said that he was aware of the
revolutionary propaganda and that he was ready to face any attempt that
might be made to overthrow the government.

"I will not stop at anything," he remarked,... "the first thing that I
shall do is to send them [revolutionaries] from the capital by the car
loads. But I will strangle the revolution no matter what the cost may
be." [FN: _Novoe Vremia_, March 19-April 1, 1917.] He had no doubt
that he could handle the situation and he inspired those about him with
the same confidence, particularly the Emperor whom he assured that the
discontent was confined chiefly to the intelligentsia and to a small
number of the gentry, and that the common people and the army were
devoted to the autocracy.

To the question that arises why the revolution, which was expected after
the war, came off before its conclusion, the answer is that the present
revolution was not planned nor desired by any one of importance; it came
as a surprise to all. It just happened. If some one must have the credit
or blame, it is Protopopov who was at the time suspected of being queer
mentally and who has since lost his reason entirely. He was so sure of
himself and of his ability to put down the uprising and thereby
show himself a real statesman that he concluded not to wait for the
revolution to come in the ordinary course of events, but to hurry it a
bit. Although there is no conclusive proof for this statement, there
is plenty of convincing circumstantial evidence. We know that it was
proposed to have the workm