s of
conciliation, especially with the German troops. You told me you could
manage them, and I rely upon you to do it At present we have more
difficulties to conquer with our own men than with the enemy.

301

While engaged in these numberless activities Gen. Halleck came down with
a severe attack of measles, and was confined to his room for two weeks,
but there does not appear to have been any intermittence in his energy.

Gen. Halleck's plans contemplated sending forward a column sufficient to
crush Price, if he could be brought to battle, and drive him out of
the State anyway. Another column was to advance from Ironton or
Fredericktown and interpose between Polk at Columbus and Price, to
prevent the former from assisting the latter. In the meanwhile Gen. Polk
would have sufficient to occupy his attention in his "Gibraltar," as
Gen. Grant would make a flank movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland
Rivers. Halleck had come to the conclusion that Columbus would cost too
much in life and blood to be taken by a direct assault, and it would be
better therefore to turn it.

This plan was an excellent one, as Halleck's plans usually were, at that
time, and it was subsequently carried out substantially as conceived.

There were the most conflicting reports as to the number of men Price
had with him at Springfield at that time, but it was supposed all the
way from 25,-000 to 50,000, with rather the stronger emphasis on the
greater number. The Secessionists insisted upon the immensity of the
army which had flocked to Price encouraged by the events untoward to the
Union cause of the last half of 1861 and the indignation aroused by the
invasion and depredations of the Kansas Jayhawkers and the "St. Louis
Dutch."

302

It was reasonable to suppose, from the state of feeling in Missouri,
that Price might have from 40,000 to 50,000 men, but Halleck, who was
unusually well-informed for our Generals at that period of the war,
decided that a column of about 10,000 men would be sufficient for the
work. In this he was at a disagreement with Gen. Curtis and others
in nearer contact with Price, who estimated the Secessionist force at
Springfield in the neighborhood of 20,000 or 25,000. Yielding to their
urgent representations, he increased his force to about 15,000, of which
3,000 were required to guard the lengthening line of communications,
leaving a movable column of 12,000 to move directly against Price. This
force was off