en
welcomed with entirely loyal subordination by both Price and McCulloch,
though both were much older than he, and had held higher commands, Gen.
Price having been a Brigadier-General at a time when Van Dorn was only a
First Lieutenant.

313

At first Van Dorn meditated moving into Missouri by the Pocahontas
route, intermediate between the Mississippi route and that by the way
of Springfield. He began assembling troops at Jacksonport, Ark., to move
directly up through the Ozark Mountains. Then the isolated situation
of Gen. Curtis's little army, with scattered detachments thrown out in
every direction, tempted him to concentrate suddenly his forces and make
the effort to cut off the outlying Union detachments and finally crush
the main body. Therefore, he hastened to the Boston Mountains, sending
messages to the scattered Confederates to meet him there, and was
welcomed on a chilly, snowy March 3 with the Major-General's salute of
40 guns, which were heard by Gen. Curtis at Cross Hollow.

After driving Gen. Price off into the Boston Mountains and successfully
flanking Gen. McCulloch out of his "Gibraltar" at Cross Hollow, Gen.
Curtis prudently halted his army there to consider his next move. The
line of Sugar Creek offered fine opportunities for defense, and from
there he could hope to maintain his communications along the great road
leading to Springfield and Holla. Not having been able to force either
McCulloch or Price to a decisive battle in which he might destroy or at
least cripple them, it did not seem discreet to venture further forward
where every step made them stronger and him weaker.

Halleck had relied upon Gen. Hunter sending down a flanking column from
Leavenworth by the way of Fort Scott, but this had not materialized,
owing to the disputes between Gens. Hunter and Jas. H. Lane. Thus 5,000
men who should have been effectively employed, either in menacing
Van Dorn's flank or increasing Curtis's strength, were held idly, at
Leavenworth.

[Transcriber's Note: The print copy has a
two page error in numbering.]

316

Halleck had also relied upon the effect of Gen. Grant's startling
victory at Fort Donelson, which shattered the first Confederate line,
to withdraw a large portion of the forces west of the Mississippi, and
relieve pressure upon Curtis. Nor had this at that time resulted. Though
the general Confederate the roads leading northward crossed Sugar Greek,
and several of them c