icially designated the "Army of the Southwest," and there
was assigned to its command our old acquaintance, Brig.-Gen. Samuel R.
Curtis, West Point graduate, lawyer, Mexican veteran, railroad engineer,
and Congressman. This made more or less heart-burning among Brig.-Gens.
Franz Sigel, B. M. Prentiss, S. A. Hurlbut, S. D. Sturgis and others
who had hopes in that direction. Sigel stood no chance for the place,
however, for Halleck had conceived a strong distrust of him growing out
of his action at Wilson's Creek, and also because he was a leader among
the radical Germans who wanted to pull slavery up by the roots. Sturgis
felt that more consideration should have been given to him as commander
of the army at Wilson's Creek after Lyon fell. Curtis, in turn, gave
strong dissatisfaction to some of the brigade commanders by selecting
Jeff C. Davis, a Captain in the Regular Army and Colonel of the 22d
Ind., and Eugene A. Carr, also a Captain in the Regular Army and Colonel
of the 3d Ill. Cav., to command two of his four divisions.

303

In its forward movement the commanders had the benefit of the burning
zeal of the young volunteers. These, who had enlisted to put down the
rebellion, wanted to lose no time in doing their work. They were not
minded to lie around camps, no matter how comfortable, during the long
Winter months. In the Northern homes from which they came the Winter had
always been a season of great activity. They could not understand why it
should not be so in Missouri and they hungered for active employment to
the great end of suppressing the rebellion. Their recent successes had
inspired them with hopes that they might be able to finish up the work
and get back home in time for their Spring duties.

Though the Winter of 1861-'62 was an exceptionally hard, disagreeable
one in Missouri, the volunteers left their camps with alacrity, pressing
forward through the storms and mud with sanguine hopefulness that they
were now about to accomplish their great purpose. Gen. Curtis selected
his first base at Lebanon, 55 miles distant from Springfield, and sent
forward Col. Carr with about 1,700 infantry and cavalry to occupy that
point, gain information as to the condition of things in Price's camp,
and to set on foot preparation for supplying the advancing army from the
surrounding country.

The Union commanders were to learn a lesson from Price, who did not
encumber himself with long trains, but "compelled war to su