le State to draw from. It was quite
otherwise with three-fourths of Missouri held by the Union troops and
Halleck's well-laid nets everywhere to catch parties of recruits trying
to make their way to Price.

Still, Price was justified in his confidence that the Union troops
would be satisfied with holding northern and central Missouri during
the Winter, and would not venture far from their base of supplies on the
Missouri River and the termini of the railroads at Rolla and Sedalia.

Whatever aggressive disposition they might have which the condition
of the roads would not dampen would be quelled by the knowledge that
McCulloch's army of Texans, Louisianians, Arkansans and Indians lay at
Cross Hollow, within easy supporting distance of him.

Therefore, Price settled down at Springfield, and his men built
comfortable cabins in which to pass the time until Spring. The Union
farmers in the country roundabout were stripped of their grain and
cattle for supplies, and Price proceeded with the organization of his
Confederate division.

Jefferson Davis's feelings toward Price and Missouri are in a measure
revealed in the following querulous letter, which also indicates Mr.
Davis's tendencies to pose as a much-enduring, martyr-like man:

295

Hon. W. P. Harris, Confederate States Congress.

My Dear Sir: Language was said by Talleyrand to be useful
for the concealment of one's thoughts; but in our day it
falls to communicate any thought. If it had been otherwise,
the complaint in relation to Gen. Price of which you speak
could not have been made. The Commissioners of Missouri were
informed that when that State offered troops they would be
organized according to our military laws, and Generals would
be appointed for brigades and divisions. Until then I have
no power to appoint Generals for those troops. The same
statements, substantially, were made to the members of
Congress from Missouri who called on me yesterday. They were
also informed that, from conversation with Informed persons
and from correspondence now on file in the War Department, I
was convinced that it was needful to the public interest
that a General should be sent to the Arkansas and Missouri
Division who had not been connected with any of the troops
on that line of operations; and to the statement that the
Missouri troops would not fully enlist under any one exc