239 U.S. 556 (1916); Lehigh
Valley R. Co. _v._ Barlow, 244 U.S. 183 (1917); Southern R. Co. _v._
Puckett, 244 U.S. 571 (1917); Reed _v._ Director General of Railroads,
258 U.S. 92 (1922). That Congress might "legislate as to the
qualifications, duties, and liabilities of employes and others on
railway trains engaged in that [interstate] commerce," was stated by the
Court in Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. _v._ Alabama, 128 U.S. 96, 99
(1888).

[407] 208 U.S. 161 (1908).

[408] 30 Stat. 424.

[409] 44. Stat. 577.

[410] Texas & N.O.R. Co. _v._ Brotherhood of R. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S.
548 (1930). The provision of Railway Labor Act of 1926 (44 Stat. 577),
preventing interference by either party with organization or designation
of representatives by the other, is within the constitutional authority
of Congress. Similarly, "back shop" employees of an interstate carrier,
who engaged in making heavy repairs on locomotives and cars withdrawn
from service for that purpose for long periods (an average of 105 days
for locomotives and 109 days for cars), were held to be within the terms
of the act as amended in 1934 (48 Stat. 1185). "The activities in which
these employees are engaged have such a relation to the other
confessedly interstate activities of the * * * [carrier] that they are
to be regarded as a part of them. All taken together fall within the
power of Congress over interstate commerce." Virginian R. Co. _v._
System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 556 (1937).

By the Adamson Act of 1916 a temporary increase in wages was imposed
upon the railways of the country in order to meet a sudden threat to
strike by important groups of their employees. The act was assailed on
the dual ground that it was not a regulation of commerce among the
States and that it was violative of the carriers' rights under the Fifth
Amendment. A closely divided Court, speaking through Chief Justice
White, answered both objections by pointing to the magnitude of the
emergency which had threatened the country with commercial paralysis and
grave loss and suffering. To the familiar argument that "emergency may
not create power" (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1806)), the Chief
Justice answered that "it may afford a reason for exerting a power
already enjoyed." A further answer to objections based on the rights of
carriers under the Fifth Amendment, particularly the right of "freedom
of contract," was that the situation met by the statute had arisen i